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The Great Recoinage of 1696: Charles Davenant
and monetary theory
CHARLES LARKIN
In 1695 the English currency was in a state of distress and a small number
of eminent persons were invited to address the crisis. John Locke and
Isaac Newton were among the most prominent members of this dis-
tinguished group, which included Sir Christopher Wren, John Wallis,
Gilbert Heathcote, John Asgill, Sir Josiah Child and Charles Davenant.1
Davenant (1656-1714), who provides the focus of this essay, was a
political arithmetician and economic policymaker from 1686 to 1714.
His work on the recoinage informs our understanding of the debate and
offers an important glimpse into the economic world of the 1690s as it
moved from a specie monetary-base driven view of policy to one
founded on financial instruments.2 The recoinage plan put forward by
Locke and his supporters (in most if not all its principles) was eventually
adopted. Davenant proposed an alternative in two unpublished contri-
butions, ‘A memorial concerning the coyn of England’ (1695) and ‘A
memoriall concerning creditt’ (1696), which describe the functioning of
the English credit system at the cusp of the Financial Revolution.
The Financial Revolution itself is more than just the institutional
developments, such as the creation of the Bank of England in 1694, that
took place during the last part of the seventeenth century and the early
part of the eighteenth century in England.3 The emergence of new
financial instruments fundamentally changed the way that commerce
was viewed. The English monetary system was no longer based only on
the coins of the realm, but was now something much broader,
incorporating paper money, bills of exchange and various financial
instruments that underwrote merchants, themilitary and the state itself.4
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1. See Kelly, ‘General introduction’, in Locke on money, vol.1, p.25. A selection of the
contributions appears in Li, The Great Recoinage, p.183-200, 217-36.
2. The monetary base is considered that part of the money supply that consists solely of
notes and coin in circulation. It is sometimes termed high-powered money. Notes during
the 1690s would have had several sources, so a precise measure of the monetary base is
therefore difficult.
3. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England.
4. This new financial world developed gradually, beginning with the financial transactions
that supported the Florentine woollen trade in the fifteenth century. This innovation
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The key impetus for these innovations was to enable the state to develop
the financial resources necessary to sustain a protracted war with France
(the Nine Years’ War, 1688-1697).5
The economic crisis of the 1690s, caused by related pressures
associated with this war and the problem of England’s silver coin, which
was severely depleted by clipping, had to be addressed by Parliament and
the Treasury. Although the Bank of England was the first bank to be
designed from the beginning as a financial arm of the state it was limited
in its functions insofar as it lacked the financial capacity to act as a lender
of last resort and the legal authority to regulate the monetary sector of
the economy. This means that in the 1690s the response to the situation
took place through temporary commissions, such as the one served on by
Locke, Newton, Davenant and their colleagues.
In 1696, facing these monetary difficulties, England made the fateful
decision to recoin all its silver currency. This choice eventually led to the
economic policy that created the famed British Gold Standard and
subsequently the International Gold Standard. Thus it was a moment
of lasting significance. Yet the story behind the recoinage has been told
in what can be considered a rather limited way. J. R. McCulloch, the first
to describe the importance of this period, in 1856, framed the question
of recoinage as a debate between John Locke, Lord Somers, acting on
behalf of the king, William Lowndes of the Treasury and Isaac Newton,
future Master of the Mint.6 Despite his giving prominence to these
individuals in the debate, all the figures asked to give their advice
presented the Lords Justices (the regency council which governed in
William III’s absence on campaign) with options for improving the
monetary situation of England. This essay will focus primarily on
Davenant’s contribution, addressed to the Lord Treasurer, Sidney
Godolphin, who secured Davenant’s participation.7
The currency crisis resulted from developments in the international
bullion market and institutional neglect, causing such a significant
deterioration of silver-based coins in circulation that the state felt that
it was forced to respond.8 As financial instruments became more ad-
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over time was transformed into the system of finance that drove Venice, Amsterdam and
Antwerp.
5. Brewer, The Sinews of power; Niall Ferguson, The Cash nexus: money and power in the modern
world, 1700-2000 (London, 2001).
6. J. R. McCulloch, ‘Note on the re-coinage of 1696-1699’, in A Select collection of scarce and
valuable tracts on money, ed. J. R. McCulloch (London, 1856), p.261-65. Newton became
Warden of the Mint in 1696 and Master in 1700.
7. Kelly, ‘ ‘‘Monkey business’’: Locke’s ‘‘College’’ correspondence’, p.154.
8. Li, The Great Recoinage; Horsefield, British monetary experiments 1650-1710; William Shaw, The
History of the currency 1252 to 1894 (London, 1895); William Shaw (ed.), Select tracts and
documents illustrative of English monetary history 1626-1730 (London, 1896).
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vanced, and with a greater breadth and depth of institutions to support
them, money became much more complex than simply precious metal
coins (specie) in circulation. Yet specie still defined money and wealth in
the minds of many policymakers and economic thinkers (tantamount to
bullionism9). Given this, it was natural for the policy response to the
difficulties facing the silver coin of England to be considered from a
purely specie point of view. Nonetheless, a solely specie-approach to
monetary policy was no longer advisable due to the developments in
financial instruments since the 1660s. This essay will consider the devel-
opment of monetary theory and policy as it attempted to react to market
and institutional developments.
First, I will discuss the monetary system as it existed in 1690s England.
This can be broken down into two analytical issues, one being the poor
state of silver coin necessitating the recoinage, and the other being the
disequilibrium in the price ratio between silver and gold. Second, I will
discuss the traditional view of the Locke, Lowndes and Newton debate.
Third, I will assess Davenant’s role in this debate and his importance in
the development of monetary thought. Finally, I will explain some of the
effects of the recoinage. While the preoccupation of Enlightenment
thinkers with money and political economy is widely recognised, insuf-
ficient attention has been given to the recoinage controversy in the 1690s
as a crucible for developments in reflection on the nature of credit and
the function of the circulating medium.
The institutional context – money and the economy in
1690s England
Today monetary policy is a function of the Central Bank. The policies of
the European Central Bank are quite clear, with the predominant model
of the Taylor Rule explaining many changes in monetary policy.10
Despite the numerous financial instruments that make up the money
supply, the monetary base or high-powered money is relatively simple to
understand and account for in the market. In the early modern period
the monetary base was specie – gold and silver – but the bimetallic specie
standard proved very difficult to maintain.
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9. Bullionism is the confusion of specie money (gold and silver) with the wealth of the
nation. The so-called ‘mercantilist’ authors are commonly associated with confusing
bullion with the national wealth. The wealth of a nation comes from its output and in
modern terms is described in Keynesian national income terms: Gross Domestic Product/
National Income (Y) = Consumption (C) + Investment (I) + Government Expenditure
(G) + the Trade Balance (Exports (X) – Imports (M)).
10. An explanation of the Taylor Rule can be found Athanasios Orphanides, ‘Taylor rules’, in
The New Palgrave dictionary of economics, 2nd edn, ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.
Blume, 8 vols (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2008), vol.8, p.200-204.
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Monetary systems that are based on specie are significantly different
from systems of fiat money now in use.11 The essential component of a
specie standard is that the market price of precious metals is kept at a
parity level (or so close to it that transaction costs eliminate profits) vis-à-
vis the Mint price of the coin.12 The public acceptance of coins required
that they be fairly consistent in weight, and despite fabrication limi-
tations the coinage was largely adequate. However, in the 1690s, the
effects of clipping the coinage had resulted in the specie system being
strained as the face value of the coinage did not correspond with the
actual metal content. These complications resulted in the eroding of
confidence in the coin and the rising of transaction costs.
As the coinage deteriorated, the ability to judge coins as full weight,
genuine or counterfeited becamemore difficult. Questioning the validity
of the coinage resulted in higher transaction costs. Simultaneously it
lowered government revenues as coins of low weight were returned to
the Treasury for tax purposes. William Lowndes writes in his Report
containing an essay for the amendment of the silver coins (1695) how the
revenues of the Crown had been significantly reduced by lack of
bullion.13
The English economy, like almost all economies of the late seventeenth
century, was intimately linked to its bullion-based currencies. A corrup-
tion of the coinage was not only potentially inflationary, but also
destructive to the very fabric of the economy and political establishment
at large. The coinage problem had its origins in the coin being the
monetary base of a specie system. Given that precious metals had a
market price, coins could be clipped or shaved and the silver or gold
gained could be melted into bullion and sold. Even when clipped, the
coin could still circulate, since it would not have been perfectly round or
correctly stamped in the first place. This was the basic problem of the
1690s: as the bullion market price of silver rose, there were profits to be
made from clipping the coinage. The invention of milling at the edges in
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11. The US Dollar, UK Sterling, the Japanese Yen and the Euro are the primary examples (in
fact all modern currencies, though many small currencies are ‘pegged’, that is, linked to
one of the larger currencies in a de facto or de jure fashion).
12. The coin would be defined as having a certain preciousmetal content (measured in carats,
like the metal content of modern jewelry, 24 carats indicating purity) and that metal
would be mixed with a baser metal such as copper, nickel or tin. The stamp on the coin
would ensure that the coin would not have to be assayed upon receipt, since the Mint, by
the sovereign stamp, ensured the fineness of the precious metal in the coin. The process
of clipping the coin undermined the stamp of the state, since there is obviously less
preciousmetal content in the coin. Even the routine process of wear and tear will result in
the coins’ value coming into question.
13. See the table indicating the deficiency in weight of coin as measured at the Treasury in
William Lowndes, A Report containing an essay for the amendment of the silver coins, p.159.
ES 2014:05 – 06_LARKIN 31/1/2014 Page 86
1662 had provided some assistance with the problem but coins in this
form were not produced in great volumes and were typically hoarded.
Thus the continued use of handicraft methods for the fabrication of the
coins (as opposed to mechanical devices powered by horses or water-
wheels) meant that milling remained of little use. Although milling was
designed to prevent clipping, coins produced with minting errors
remained in constant circulation it became difficult to discern clipped
coins from coins that were carelessly produced. This enabled the coins to
be clipped with little ability to stop the process. As more and more coins
were clipped, the face value of the existing body of coins came into
question, raising transaction costs. By 1696 over 50 per cent of the
precious metal content of the coinage was removed.14
This problem becomes even more difficult to solve in a case where
there are two precious metals used for money. While England used both
gold and silver in the 1690s, it was the silver coin that was being clipped.
This was due to the ratio of gold to silver being upset by the high Mint
price of gold and the high bullion price of silver. Though this is a simple
problem to grasp theoretically, it again is difficult to solve in practice.
In 1696 England was at war with France. The war was largely fought on
the Continent, and King William III and his armies required a constant
flow of remittances from London. This created arbitrage opportunities.
As the specie prices rose and fell on the international bullion markets,
individuals could melt down clippings and sell them abroad for money if
the price disparity were great enough. An example in the 1690s would be
to clip silver coin, melt it into bullion and sell it on the Continent for
gold coin, where silver fetched a higher price than in England. This gold
coin would then be shipped back to England where the Royal Mint was
paying a higher price for gold than other countries. This gold would be
sold to the Mint for silver money and the arbitrageur would make a
profit. The result would be a drain of silver and an oversupply of gold.
The bimetallic specie standard requires that the mint price of specie
and the bullion market price of specie of both silver and gold should be
equal or sufficiently close that transaction and transport costs eliminate
all arbitrage profits. If this delicate balance was disturbed between the
market to Mint price and the price ratio of silver to gold, it could result
in the coined currency being altered for profit making purposes (that is,
if gold’s mint price rises and silver’s bullion price rises, this would result
in gold flowing into the mint and being coined and silver coinage leaving
circulation to be sold on the bullion markets). This would typically
involve clipping the coin (or in extreme cases actually fully melting down
coins), thereby debasing the monetary standard. Such a scenario would
87The Great Recoinage of 1696: Charles Davenant and monetary theory
14. Jones, War and economy in the age of William III and Marlborough.
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have debilitating results for the economy, resulting from rising trans-
action costs and reduced liquidity as the face value of the coin came into
question and more specie left the monetary base.15
The coinage problems in 1696 provide an example of this type of
imbalance. Dutch silver had a higher bullion price than the English Royal
Mint’s price for silver. This caused silver to flow out of England into
Holland to gain the arbitrage profit. England, on the other hand, had a
very high mint price for gold. Continental gold bullion (paid to the
English sellers for their silver bullion) was imported into England and
sold to the Royal Mint. The result of this was that silver coinage became
scarce and gold coinage became plentiful.
Thus there was an added incentive to clip the silver coin and export it
as bullion abroad. Clipping the coin resulted in a problem for the
economy at large as it undermined the face value of the coin, increasing
transaction costs of doing business. Second, it was debilitating to the
collection of taxes to fund the war, as remittances required full-weight
(unclipped) coin. William Lowndes in his submission to Parliament on
the state of the coin in England found that the weight of the coin
entering the Treasury from tax collection was almost half what it should
have been. As seen in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the fiscal situation was quite
poor. As England exported more specie to pay remittances and incurred
more foreign denominated debt the economy came under greater and
greater stress.
The corruption of the coinage made covering the cost of remittances
extremely difficult.16 The problem of the coin rapidly became not just
economic but one of military logistics, as funds to supply William’s army
were being slowed by monetary constraints in England. The war with
Louis XIV was at a stalemate: any weakness, financial or otherwise, could
result in the Anglo-Dutch alliance being defeated. William could not
afford this and the Commission’s brief was to find a rapid solution to the
problem.
Clipped coinage and silver outflows together created a liquidity
problem for the economy. As Thomas Sargent and François Velde,
and Angela Redish have found, until the advent of the steam press and
low cost methods of coin and paper money production, small change was
a scarce commodity.17 The silver outflow only made this problem worse
in England. Between 1694 and 1696, silver’s bullion price rose, resulting
in silver coins being clipped and the clippings melted and sold on the
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15. For further information on this monetary system see Angela Redish, Bimetallism: an
economic and historical analysis (Cambridge, 2000).
16. Lowndes, Report containing an essay for the amendment of the silver coins, p.87-90.
17. Sargent and Velde, The Big problem of small change (Princeton, NJ, 2002); and Redish,
Bimetallism.
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bullion market. As this process of clipping expanded, the quantity of
small denomination coins was reduced (both in the sense that they were
lighter post clipping, and because more and more of them were being
melted outright into bullion), and a liquidity problem emerged. Sargent
and Velde state that the liquidity problem at the small-denomination
end of the market increased transaction costs and made transactions
between individuals more difficult.
The question of the Recoinage was framed within this economic
context. The Commission existed to find a solution to a problem that
was obviously becoming an economic, political and military liability.
Money to most persons (and Locke states this explicitly in Some consider-
ations of the consequences of the lowering of interest, and raising the value of money
(1692)) was silver coin. Gold was also in circulation but as a high
denomination coin (30s. in mid-1695) it was used by few individuals,
similar to a e500 note today.18 In order to find a solution to the looming
remittance problem and the liquidity crisis facing the economy,
Lowndes, Locke, Newton, Davenant and others were asked to find a
quick method of correction.
The proposals varied greatly. Within the structure of a specie stand-
ard, one possibility was to change the weight of the coin by increasing or
decreasing metal content. A second potential solution was to change the
face value of the coin and maintain the present metal content. Locke
desired to bring the coinage back to its original face value and metal
content. This was consistent with his social contract philosophy – the
state had an obligation to maintain property, and this property included
coinage. Lowndes proposed a considerable devaluation as a method of
finding a rapid solution. Davenant, drawing on his experience as an
economic policymaker as one of the Commissioners for Excise and his
expertise in political arithmetic, was behind the idea of maintaining the
status quo and supporting the expansion of England’s credit system. In
his twomanuscripts, ‘Amemorial concerning the coyn of England’ (1695)
and ‘A memoriall concerning creditt’ (1696), which were rediscovered
and edited by Abbot Payson Usher in 1942, Davenant outlines the idea of
an economy that does not require a perfectly functioning specie system
to survive. In doing so, Davenant provides a view of the beginnings of the
Financial Revolution in late seventeenth-century England, and in this
description he outlines the importance of credit in the monetary system.
His input into the policy discussion on Recoinage was not accepted, but
it enriched the debate and confirmed his position as an important
contributor to the origins of the Classical School of Economics.19
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18. See Sargent and Velde, The Big problem of small change, for more on this topic.
19. To quote Keynes: ‘ ‘‘The classical Economists’’ was a name invented by Marx to cover
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The specie-focused policy – the debate between
Locke & Lowndes
The position put forth by Lowndes, speaking on the behalf of Treasury,
was that devaluation of the coin was by far the best course of action for
the Crown, maintaining the face value of the coin but establishing a
much lower precious metal content. The breakdown, due to clipping, of
the linkage between the intrinsic and extrinsic values of the coin is at the
heart of the problems facing England’s money in the 1690s. Lowndes’s
proposal did attempt to correct this problem, and by bringing the face
value into line with the current (much reduced) metal content by law he
expected that the problem of silver outflows and gold inflows to stop.
Lowndes sets out his ideas and those of the Treasury principally in his
Report (dated 12 September 1695).20 The Report, which argued its case in
part by offering a history of English currency since the time of William
the Conqueror, drew the conclusion that the English silver coinage
should be devalued by 25 per cent. The nominal value (that is, extrinsic
value) of the Crown piece would be raised from 5s. to 6s. 3d. and all other
silver coinage in proportion. As silver coins would now have a higher face
value, or Mint price, the incentive to sell silver bullion would be
eliminated. This was a course of action that would solve some of the
immediate problems facing the Crown, but not the long-term questions,
such as the bimetallic ratio.
Lowndes began his discussion by stating that the standard fineness of
the coin should be maintained. This statement prepares the ground for
his solution of devaluation. The devaluation would be considered size-
able even by modern standards. He explains his rationale in this way:
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Ricardo and James Mill and their predecessors, that is to say for the founders of the theory
which culminated in the Ricardian economics. I have become accustomed, perhaps
perpetrating a solecism, to include in ‘‘the classical school’’ the followers of Ricardo, those,
that is to say, who adopted and perfected the theory of the Ricardian economics,
including (for example) J. S. Mill, Edgeworth and Prof. Pigou’ (John Maynard Keynes,
The General theory of employment, interest, and money (NewYork, 1936), p.3) [original emphasis].
20. Research by Patrick Kelly (‘General introduction’, in Locke on money) indicates that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, Charles Montague, was responsible for
commissioning this work. Montague was Chancellor for the entire Recoinage and was
the sponsor of the Recoinage Acts in Parliament. The basis for this assertion is the
similarity of the Lowndes report with the Fourteen Resolutions of the Scobell Committee.
Montague was the moving spirit behind these points and a fervent supporter of devalu-
ation; he attempted to press for a resolution of Parliament in spring 1695 with the
support of Godolphin. The political machinations of the time, most especially the desire
of the king to maintain the monetary standard, and the price of reconciliation between
the Montague and Wharton faction and the Shrewsbury and Somers faction following a
leadership challenge, meant that the devaluation proposal had to be abandoned.
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The Value of the Silver in the Coin ought to be Raised to the Foot to Six
Shillings Three Pence in every Crown, because the Price of Standard Silver is
Bullion is Risen (from divers necessary and unnecessary Causes, producing
at length a great scarcity thereof in England) to Six Shillings Five Pence an
Ounce: This Reason (which I humbly conceive will appear irrefragable) is
grounded chiefly upon a Truth so Apparent, that it may well be compared to
an Axiom even in Mathematical Reasoning, to wit, That whensoever the
Extrinsick Value of Silver in the Coin had been, or shall be less than the price of Silver
in Bullion, the Coin hath been, and will be Melted down. [original emphasis]21
Despite the logical position that if the price of bullion is higher than the
face value of the coin, bullion will be exported (be it in the form of
clippings from coins or in bars of silver) his devaluation was too radical
for the Parliament to adopt.22 The problem was that Lowndes’s plan
would have resulted in the removal of silver from themonetary system, as
there were no provisions in his plans to alter the gold to silver ratio or to
reduce the fineness of the specie. Silver was considered to be the true
currency of England; gold was secondary.
There were errors in Lowndes’s analysis of the benefits of the devalu-
ation of the silver currency. One of the most striking of these errors, and,
interestingly, one that continues to this day, was that he viewed devalu-
ation as a panacea for international payments problems. Lowndes stated:
‘It is hoped that the Exchange to Holland, (which by the way had risen a
little of late) may by the Success of some good Designs on Foot (though
the War should continue) be kept at a stand, at least from falling much
lower.’23 He further defended his position by stating that there was a
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21. Lowndes, Report containing an essay for the amendment of the silver coins, p.38.
22. The question of its reasonableness as a monetary policy must also be addressed.
Lowndes’s proposal was effectively a devaluation of the currency. As modern economists
are aware, the policy of devaluation has long-run negative welfare effects, even if there are
some positive effects to creating a temporary, artificial competitive advantage. Lowndes
accepted that a de facto devaluation of Sterling had occurred as a result of the loss of silver
content of coins in circulation through clipping. Horsefield, British monetary experiments,
and Li, The Great Recoinage, both address this question within the context of financial
instruments and policy debate. The alternative, to restore the silver content of the
currency to face value, would set in motion a process of deflation. Deflation also has
welfare implications. In welfare terms, a devaluation typically results in domestic in-
flation, improved short-run external competitiveness, and an increase in the debt burden
on firms and individuals that have borrowed in foreign currency. Inflation results in the
decrease in the burdens on domestic currency borrowers at the expense of lenders. Those
that hold foreign currency loans are placed under extreme stress and may be faced with
the need to restructure debt or default. The impact is that it benefits domestic borrowers.
Following a deflationary course of action benefits lenders at the cost of borrowers.
Deflation also dampens consumption and begins to encourage a vicious cycle of thrift
that slows credit and economic growth. Such welfare considerations were not mentioned
in such clear terms but the relative impact of the state of the coin was a cause of concern
for lenders. Davenant expands this discussion to include liquidity considerations.
23. Lowndes, Report containing an essay for the amendment of the silver coins, p.72-73.
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distinct need for a reliable base of specie for the smooth running of the
domestic economy. Though devaluations had been used in the past, the
scale of the devaluation in the Lowndes proposal was radical, in the sense
that a 25 per cent devaluation was unprecedented. But his Report was also
insightful, in that it provided a corpus of monetary history of England to
inform his side of the debate. Locke worked diligently to discredit the
proposal, and eventually won the day.
Locke and Lowndes shared a common vision despite their different
approaches to the recoinage; they both saw silver as the true money of
England and gold as a distant second. They also both believed that the
monetary system needed to be grounded in specie.
Locke felt that since silver was paramount, it was the link between the
intrinsic and extrinsic values of the coin that required the greatest
defence. This reflects his understanding of the currency system both
philosophically and empirically. He was resolutely against the idea of
devaluation and had powerful support from King William as well as
friends such as Lord Somers and Trumbell. (Somers was one of the
principal members of the Whig administration and an ardent opponent
of the devaluation proposal put forward by Lowndes.) Locke was also
driven by his ideas on property and social contract. For Locke, the state
had a responsibility to its citizens to provide a sound currency. In
debasing the currency, the state would effectively renege on its responsi-
bility to ensure that property (which was defined as money in this
situation) be maintained to the standard that the citizenry expected,
that is, its true weight and measure. The state’s role in the production of
money was to issue a stamp of value that served at the same time as a
statement guaranteeing that the extrinsic and intrinsic value of the coin
coincided with what the Royal Mint specified in production. The state
ensured that the silver content of the coin was equal to its face value;
Locke therefore felt that the debased coin must be returned to its
original intrinsic value, as that was the promise made by the stamp of
value. This entailed recoining according to the existing standard.
Locke apparently had difficulty reconciling the Guinea situation with
contemporary problems of the de facto bimetallic currency. The de jure
currency of England was silver. Locke approaches this problem from the
point of view that only silver exists as legal tender. This complicates his
analysis and causes him to reject the interplay between gold and silver in
international markets.24
Arbitrage opportunities created by the war had allowed for a complex
market to develop between silver, gold and bills of exchange. It was clear
that silver was leaving the country at an alarming rate. Lacking in Locke’s
96 Charles Larkin
24. Kelly, ‘General introduction’, in Locke on money.
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analysis was the price-specie-flow mechanism: the price-specie-flow-
mechanism is a long-run adjustment mechanism for the effects of specie
exports and imports. An excess of imported goods results in specie
exports in the short run. This loss of specie causes the money supply of
the country to be reduced. The reducedmoney supply causes a reduction
in the price level. This conclusion follows from an early version of
Quantity Theory of Money. The theory had its origin in the Spanish
authors in the mid-1500s and the School of Salamanca, so would have
been readily accessible in the late seventeenth century.25
The Quantity Theory26 holds that with a lower quantity of money,
consumption will be reduced (given that money supply must equal
money demand), but with unchanged levels of output of goods and
services prices are lower. The reduction of prices as a result of the
outflow of specie is the key to the long-run adjustment mechanism. The
lower prices subsequently result in the increase in exports, as the home
country gains a competitive price advantage. Additionally, there will be a
reduction in the level of imports as they become less competitive vis-à-vis
domestically produced output. With the combination of cheaper dom-
estic goods and more expensive imports (reducing demand), the result
was less foreign exchange demanded at each spot rate of foreign
exchange. This system would bring about the natural adjustment of a
country’s prices level and specie levels as a result of specie imports and
exports.27 Though Locke did understand the concept of the Quantity
Theory of Money he did not link it to the price-specie-flow mechanism.
Such a link would not bemade until Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature
du commerce en général (1755; composed between 1728 and 1730) and David
Hume’s Political discourses (1752).28 Implementation of this theory would
have been revolutionary in the late seventeenth century since it
represented a stark departure from the Balance of Trade theory that
specie inflows via a constant balance of payment surplus were desirable.
Locke’s economic epistemology is another potential pitfall in his
analysis. When Locke expanded upon his position that the coin should
be restored to its original state at the expense of the public hemade clear
that silver was the true currency of England:
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25. See BernardW. Dempsey, ‘The historical emergence of Quantity Theory’, Quarterly journal
of economics 50:1 (1935), p.174-84; and Earl J. Hamilton, American treasure and the price
revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, MA, 1934) for more discussion of the formation
of the Quantity Theory. On Locke’s understanding of the theory, see Kelly, ‘General
introduction’, in Locke on money, vol.1, p.84-86.
26. Here described in modern terms of MV=PY [money supply  the velocity of money =
price level  national output (GDP)].
27. Charles Poor Kindleberger, International economics, 3rd edn (Homewood, IL, 1963).
28. Murphy, The Genesis of macroeconomics, p.89, 105-112.
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Money is the measure of Commerce, and of the rate of everything, and
therefore ought to be kept (as all other measures) as steady and invariable as may
be. But this cannot be, if yourMoney be made of two Metals, whose proportion,
and consequently whose price, constantly varies in respect of one another.
Silver, for many Reasons, is the fittest of all Metals to be this measure, and
therefore generally made use of for Money. But then it is very unfit and
inconvenient, that Gold, or any other metal, should be made current Legal
Money, at a standing settled Rate.29 [original emphasis]
Locke had decided that the best of course of action for the government
was tomaintain the standard of money and restore the clipped and worn
money to its original status. The maintenance of parity between the seal
and the actual intrinsic content was the key to running a viable monetary
system, as Locke emphasised:
Only this I will confidently affirm, That it is the Interest of every Country, that all
current Money of it should be of one and the same Metal; That the several Species should
be all of the same Alloy, and none of a baser mixture: And that the Standard once thus
settled, should be Inviolably and Immutably kept to perpetuity. For whenever that is
alter’d upon what pretence soever, the Publick will lose by it.30 [original
emphasis]
The focus on the Scholastic concept of intrinsic value was vitally im-
portant to Locke’s understanding of money. Intrinsic value is a passive
power, a quality which enables one object to affect another, whereas
exchange value is a relative quality and can only be considered second-
ary.31
Money exists through common consent; it is part of that compact
whereby society has allowed itself to be regulated by the law of nature. The
maintenance of money’s extrinsic and intrinsic value is part of that
regulation. This is not a literal contract or in any way explicit, but a tacit
agreement. As Kelly observes:
Consent, for Locke, is concurrence in a mutually beneficial course of action,
arising as it were in the form of spontaneous intellectual assent once the
advantages of an arrangement become apparent. In the Second Treatise men
consent to the adoption of money, since by permitting the accumulation of
the surplus product and facilitating the division of labour money makes
possible a more advanced standard of living.32
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30. Locke, Some considerations, p.329.
31. To look at it from the point of view of pure Scholastic thought, the valor impositus on silver
comes from its function as the medium of exchange; the valor intrinsicus of money is the
product of the common consent of all to acknowledge this medium of barter or exchange
universally. Locke firmly plants himself in the category of a neo-scholastic natural law
theorist by embracing this epistemological construct.
32. Kelly, ‘General introduction’, in Locke on money, vol.1, p.87-88.
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Locke’s understanding of money is only part of his approach to the
Recoinage. While Lowndes presents the historically proven and trad-
itional policy option of devaluation (though on a scale never attempted
before, which was the ultimate downfall of his proposal), Locke abandons
this familiar and somewhat pragmatic approach. Locke differs from
Davenant, however, in so far as he does not understand the importance
of credit to the English monetary system and consequently to the
economy. In addition, Locke’s methodology is highly distinctive. Eco-
nomics, for Locke, exists as part of the field of praktikê and not as part of a
Baconian experimental science. Praktikê he defined in the Essay as
The Skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment
of Things good and useful. Themost considerable under this Head, is Ethicks,
which is the seeking out those Rules, and Measures of humane Actions,
which lead to Happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is
not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct
suitable to it.33
Davenant’s analysis, however, is the product of ‘Political Arithmetick’, a
fundamentally different epistemological method. Davenant viewed
things from a Baconian, pragmatic perspective. He followed the empiri-
cal tradition that he had learned from the writings of Sir William Petty
(who is frequently cited in Davenant’s published works) but he was also
willing to innovate in science, even to introduce intellectual inconsist-
encies, subject to the pragmatic needs of the moment, something that
was made clear during his time as a Commissioner of Excise. This is not
to deny the empiricism that is the cornerstone of Locke’s thought, but
this empiricism is applied in the context of an understanding of eco-
nomic issues which retains a more traditional mercantilist and scholastic
character.
Locke’s proposal won out, therefore maintaining the de facto bimetallic
system and bringing the coin back to full weight through the recoinage.
The system remained legally bimetallic but over time market forces and
transactions preference caused a shift from silver to gold as being the
dominant monetary coin, something that none of the participants
expected. It was left to Newton to compensate for this shift during his
various roles at the Mint.34 The problem was created by Locke’s resolute
position that the linkages between what money passes for in the market
and what the silver content of that money was would ensure the
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33. Locke, An Essay concerning human understanding, IV.xxi.3 (p.720).
34. This was because Newton was the only member of the advisory body to be placed in a
position where he could significantly alter monetary affairs. Newton was madeWarden in
1696 and Master in 1700. As Master of the Mint he changed the price of the guinea many
times over his tenure to stop the outflow of silver coin.
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functioning of England’s monetary system. His final thoughts related to
the devaluation supported by Lowndes’s proposal, where he predicted
that Lowndes’s recommendation would result in the complete elimin-
ation of all the milled money of England as well as the already corrupted
stamped money.
A swift solution to the problem of recoinage was extremely important
to King William, as political and military considerations were pressing.
The decision was made to recoin at the existing legal standard. The
advice of the Lords close to the king was that recoinage should not be
undertaken as a royal decree but under the auspices of Parliament. In the
king’s speech on 23 November 1695, he mentioned the ill state of the
coin and the need to expedite a solution to this problem, though he gave
no indication of the precise plan.35 The Commons began to formulate a
general position on recoinage during the month of December. By the
10th of December a resolution was proposed that followed the spirit of
Locke’s thinking, if not all of his provisions.
In January 1696, Godolphin took over the Commons’ proposal and the
Earl of Rochester essentially created a new bill.36 The first coinage bill
was passed on 13 January 1696: the ‘Act for Remedying the Ill State of the
Coin of the Kingdom’ took effect on 17 January 1696.37 It was decided
that by the 4th of May clipped coins would cease to be considered legal
tender, and by the 24th of June they would no longer be acceptable as a
form of payment for taxes.
The proposals of both Locke and Lowndes had explicitly ignored the
problem of gold and the bimetallic question. The action or rather
inaction of Parliament and the ensuing confusion over the gold situation
made this issue even plainer. In a letter signed 22 September 1698, Locke
wrote to the Lords Justices as a Commissioner of Trade, imploring the
Government to solve the continuing problem of guineas which he had
neglected in his proposal on recoining silver. The recommendation was
to lower the guinea to 21s. 6d. from the current price of 22s, although
this was not enacted until 1699 on the advice of Newton, when the Bank
of England refused guineas at 22s.
Following this painful monetary contraction, Newton had come to the
understanding that as long as the price of silver bullion was higher than
that of the legal rate of the coinage there would be no natural inflow of
silver into the Mint, because it would be more profitable to sell silver on
the bullion market. According to Ming-Hsun Li:
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35. Henry Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III.
36. Rose, England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war. Rochester was another powerful
member of the Tories.
37. Li, The Great Recoinage.
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It appears that gold had been over-valued all along since the recoinage of
1696-1699 [....] Although the price of guineas was reduced to 21s 6d apiece
during 1699-1717 and to 21s thereafter, the overvaluation of gold still
existed in England up to 1760 at least. In 1702 and 1717 Newton had
observed that while a guinea was only worth 20s 5d to 20s 6d on the
European Continent, it was accepted in England at no less than 21s 6d,
the difference being 4 to 5 per cent. It was therefore most advantageous to
ship gold to England and to bring it to the mint to be coined.38
The further instructions left to the Commons by King William and
Lord Somers were to consider the price of guineas, whose price fluctu-
ations were already resulting in exchange rate difficulties and a scarcity
of small denomination coinage.39 At 30s. per guinea and with the price
rising rapidly there was an acute need for the over-valuation of gold to be
resolved. ‘The Act for taking off the Obligation and Incouragement for
Coining Guineas for a certain time therein mentioned’ (5 March 1696)
addressed the problem by immediately lowering the price of guineas
from 28s. to 26s., subsequently to 25s. and finally to 22s.
Ultimately, Locke’s errors and the confusion over the future value of
guineas were problems solved by Newton. The outflow of silver coins
continued after the recoinage was completed, while gold inflows and the
coining of gold increased. The value of the guinea to the public was 21s.
6d. and it was received at that rate for all payments. McCulloch suggests
that
It appears, however, from the best attainable information, that this valuation
of 21s. 6d. was really equivalent to a premiumof 10d. in favour of theGuinea,
it being worth only about 20s. 8d. of the new Coins. And in consequence of
this marked, though unintentional preference of Gold, it was used, to the
exclusion of silver, in all considerable payments; while the new Coins of the
latter, being not only under-valued but in excess, immediately began to be
exported.40
The premium on bullion still drew silver out of the country and the ratio
between silver and gold had not been modified sufficiently to ensure the
retention of a bimetallic system. Newton, unlike Locke, felt that passing
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38. Li, The Great Recoinage, p.167. Future commentators stated that the real problemwas a lack
of devaluation of silver. The reduction in the price of the guinea was politically prob-
lematic since it was disadvantageous to important parts of the State apparatus, due to the
main holders of gold coin being the Government and the Bank of England. In addition
England was engaged in several wars between Spain and France between 1702 and 1721,
which further complicated this monetary correction. ‘Both [Richard] Cantillon and [John]
Conduit suggest that the right course to take should have been a devaluation of the silver
standard. The latter recommended that the devaluation be about 4 per cent’ (Li, The Great
Recoinage, p.172).
39. Horwitz, Parliament, policy and politics in the Reign of William III.
40. McCulloch, ‘Note on the re-coinage of 1696-1699’, p.263-64.
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the clipped silver coin by weight was an impractical approach. His
position fell between those of Locke and Lowndes: he proposed that
the coin be brought back to its mandated full weight in stages.
By 1702, 21s. 6d. was an over-valuation of 9d. (3.49 per cent) and had
resulted in a surplus of gold coinage over the previous thirteen years.41
Newton realised the mistakes of the past and to rectify the situation he
made a final decision on the future of Sterling late in his tenure at the
Mint – a Proclamation issued on the reduction of the value of the guinea
from 21s. 6d. to 21s. (a fall of 2.32 per cent), and a final gold-to-silver ratio
decided at 1:15.212 gold to silver. Still, Newton’s final intervention to
correct the errors of 1696 was for nought. There was still an
overvaluation of the guinea of 4d. or 1.58 per cent. Sterling became de
facto mono-metallic from 1717 to 1816, with the silver stock of coinage
becoming entirely secondary coins, well-worn and of little importance.42
The Earl of Liverpool legalised this situation with the recoinage at the
close of the eighteenth century.
Davenant and a financial-instrument based point of view
Charles Davenant, an advanced economic thinker and astute prac-
titioner of the method of political arithmetic, had many ideas on
recoinage and monetary theory that deserve exploration. His relative
neglect in the context of the debate on recoinage has been due to a
number of factors. Waddell has commented on Davenant’s reputation as
a Tory ‘pen for hire’ and his extreme desire to regain the patronage and
power he lost with the end of the Stuart monarchy. This has traditionally
caused some concern about his integrity.43
Davenant’s two statements to the Commission were not printed at the
time, and themain trace of the debate in his better-known works appears
in his continued references to the Recoinage and insistence that it was a
detrimental decision for many years after 1696. Though Davenant’s logic
is not always watertight, he is still able to demonstrate to the reader clear
conclusions, based on a method of analysis that helps to draw them
together.
Unlike Lowndes, Davenant approached the questions of the Great
Recoinage from the point of view of deductive science. Davenant first set
out his theories on money and credit and then proceeded to provide an
answer to the questions that were posed to him by Lord Godolphin. This
section of the essay will address Davenant’s background and will set out
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his monetary theories and their influence on his approach to the
problem of recoinage.
Davenant, it is important to note, was from the first against the idea of
the recoinage and felt that devaluation would only result in inflation and
a worsening of the exchange rate with Holland. Unlike both Locke and
Lowndes, he was of the mind that the recoinage should be delayed as
long as possible, at least until the completion of the war, and should
under no circumstances be rectified by devaluation.44 His most pressing
concern was that the war with France made England vulnerable; to
engage in such a risky action as a comprehensive recoinage would only
result in disaster. He believed that as the problem had existed for so long
a delay until the end of the war would not significantly exacerbate the
situation. The central precept to which Davenant continuously returned
was the need for a base of money in which there was confidence, but the
draft horse of the monetary system of England was to be found, he
insisted, in credit, not bullion. Credit was more flexible and able to
absorb real and monetary sector shocks better than specie.
Davenant was one of the bridging individuals in the history of eco-
nomic thought. He was a student of the school of ‘Political Arithmetick’.
This was a method of analysis designed to assist in the running of
government and the creation of policy. Davenant subscribed to the
philosophy of Sir William Petty, whose Political Arithmetick appeared
posthumously in in 1690 (only five years prior to Davenant’s writing
on the state of the coinage and money of England), after having been
developed and practised much earlier in the 1670s.45
Davenant was a civil servant during the period of 1686 to 1714, though
this was not a continuous position. The law had never provided him with
a sufficient income so that in 1678 he became a Commissioner of
Excise.46 Davenant was elected MP during the reign of James II for St
Ives in Cornwall in 1685. He was later returned to Parliament as MP for
Great Bedwyn in 1698 and again in 1700.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 resulted in his removal from the
Commissioners of Excise. As his career in government came to a
dramatic halt his own personal fortune, derived from his father, Sir
William Davenant, Poet Laureate and general in the army of Charles I,
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44. Charles Davenant, ‘Amemorial concerning the coyn of England’ (1695), in Twomanuscripts
by Charles Davenant, ed. Abbott Payson Usher (Baltimore, MD, 1942), p.28-29 and 62-63.
45. The most notable exercise in this mathematical method came in the Davenant-King Law
of Demand, which was one of the first formulations of the law of demand in the history of
economic thought.
46. Julian Hoppit, ‘Davenant, Charles (1656-1714)’, in Oxford dictionary of national biography; D.
A. G. Waddell, ‘The career and writings of Charles Davenant (1656–1714)’ (Doctoral
dissertation, University of Oxford, 1954).
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was obliterated. A personal loan of £30,000 made by Davenant (and two
partners) to the Crown was defaulted on, resulting in monetary diffi-
culties that plagued Davenant for the rest of his life.47
On the accession of Queen Anne in 1702, Davenant returned to
political favour and negotiated through the Lord Treasurer Godolphin
in 1703 a post as secretary on the Commission on the Union of Scotland
and England and a diplomatic post in Frankfurt for his son Henry.48 In
June 1703 he obtained the lucrative position of Inspector-General of
Exports and Imports. Davenant took this to be a position of advisor to
the British Government on economic policy and his Report to the com-
missioner for public accounts (1712) includes a statement of the most
economically favourable policies to develop trade and increase the
wealth of the nation in addition to the comprehensive and well devised
statistics developed by Davenant.
In his position as a policymaker in the 1680s Davenant distinguished
himself as an economist. Though he took many of his ideas from figures
like Petty, he advanced upon their methods of political arithmetic and
modelling. Davenant designed his theories and policies around his
circular model of wealth and trade, his theory of credit, and his statistical
analysis of the de facto economy,49 which will be elaborated below. As a
practitioner he not only illustrated his ideas but also developed and
refined them, ultimately using them to form economic policy and advice
for England.50
Unlike Locke or Lowndes, Davenant saw money not as bullion but as
credit.51 One finds through inspection of Davenant’s writings that,
although he recognised the importance of accumulating specie as a
concern of the state, he differed from the mercantilist view by arguing
that this was not the principal aim of economic activity.52 Davenant
began his discussion with a statement that the position of public credit
had consistently improved since 1667.53 He further developed the credit
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47. Hoppit, ‘Davenant, Charles (1656-1714)’; Waddell, ‘The career and writings of Charles
Davenant (1656-1714)’.
48. Waddell, ‘The career and writings of Charles Davenant (1656-1714)’.
49. Brewer, The Sinews of power, p.78.
50. Davenant’s financial problems and political concerns resulted in a life-long friendship
with James Brydges (the future first Duke of Chandos). This friendship would be an
important part of his access to the government and involvement in policy decisions. See
Godfrey Davies and Marjorie Scofield, ‘Letters of Charles Davenant’, Huntington library
quarterly 4:3 (1941), p.309-42.
51. This is not immediately apparent fromhis works, where he tends to be less than consistent.
52. The main reason for his interest in specie may be a direct result of the economics of war,
when gold and silver were the only medium of exchange (true even as recently as World
War II).
53. An interestingnotecomes fromhis commentthat tradebetweennations tookplaceeven in
the absence of specie, an indication of themove of the economy towards amore fiat-based
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system as a circulating system of flows, much like Sir William Petty’s
description,54 but noted that there were failures preventing the circu-
lation of credit throughout the whole of England.
Davenant, like Petty, considered money to be an important factor in
the economic system and understood that lack of access to money, or for
that matter credit, damaged the economy, led to unemployment and
impaired the nation’s productivity.55 Credit was needed as trade
expanded and England was exposed to competition from the rest of
world. The core principles that guided Davenant’s ideas came from an
interpretation of money as something that is used as a means of
exchange rather than as the definition of wealth. He made this point
of view clear in the following statement:
for gold and silver are themeasure of wealth, all things [are] dear or cheap as
that sort of wealth is wanted or abounding. And in all countries of the world
where money is rare and scare, the product of the earth is cheap; as for
instance, in Scotland, Ireland, the Northern Kingdoms, Germany and most
parts of Asia and America [....]56
Davenant’s theory of money was steeped in the concept of monetary
flows, originating through the wealth that trade provides (which he calls
the foundation of credit). Money was part of the economy. It was the
measure of the economy; it was a source of growth by providing a basis
for credit, but contrary to the claims of Smith and others in their
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monetary system. He outlined that those who desire to charge high rates of interest are
doing damage to the public good and to the government. Due to this failure of policy, the
monetary systemmust be regulated in such a manner that the government finds it easy to
gain access to credit and at a reasonable rate of interest.
54. SirWilliamPetty outlines his views onmoney and the circular flow of incomemodel in his
Quantulumcunque concerning money (1682) published in 1695. Petty’s ideas, techniques and
data are repeatedly cited by Davenant, elaborated upon and used as part of his arguments
relating to trade andmonetary policy as well as assisting in his work on the law of demand.
SeeMurphy, The Genesis of macroeconomics, p.36-40, for a brief summary of Petty’s monetary
thought. On Davenant in comparison to Petty see Schumpeter, History of economic analysis,
p.212-13; Luigi Cossa, An Introduction to the study of political economy, trans. Louis Dyer
(London, 1893); John Creedy, ‘On the King-Davenant ‘‘Law’’ of demand’, Scottish journal of
political economy 33:3 (1986), p.193-212; A. M. Endres, ‘The functions of numerical data in
the writings of Graunt, Petty, and Davenant’, History of political economy 17:2 (1985), p.245-
64; Endres, ‘The King-Davenant ‘‘Law’’ in classical economics’, History of political economy
19:4 (1987), p.621-38; Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism: the shaping of an economic language
(London, 1994); Miles Ogborn, ‘The capacities of the state: Charles Davenant and the
management of the Excise, 1683-1698’, Journal of historical geography 24:3 (1998), p.289-312;
StephenM. Stigler, ‘Jevons on the King-Davenant Law of demand: a simple resolution of a
historical puzzle’, History of political economy 26:2 (1994), p.185-91; and Aspromourgos, On
the origins of classical economics.
55. Murphy, The Genesis of macroeconomics, p.38-39.
56. Charles Davenant, The Political and commercial works of that celebrated writer Charles D’Avenant,
LL.D., ed. Sir Charles Whitworth, 5 vols (London, R. Horsfield et al., 1771), vol.1, p.160.
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polemics against the Mercantilists, it was not the economy itself.
Davenant took the idea of monetary flows and brought it to a new level
by applying concepts based upon a theory formulated from observations
and political arithmetic to outline feasible policy recommendations.
Money, to Davenant, was a tool of economic growth and a signal of
stability. The use of economic factors (fiscal policy, monetary policy,
currency, taxation) as tools in policy making was a giant leap from
previous English authors in the direction of modern economics. Prior
writers used money as the object of policy; the law was the agent and
catalyst of change. Davenant went further – he used money and credit as
the agent and catalyst of change for the objective of expanding output
and employment. Davenant went beyond Petty by applying theory to
reality directly, by trying to make a scientific study of the natural laws of
the market and then to use these laws to change the final outcome of the
market over time. By understanding the actual mechanisms that govern
the economy he took a radical new step in policy making away from the
earlier position of legally imposing order on ‘disorder’. The old method
of coinage laws and the proposal of Lowndes and Locke attempted to
alter the monetary system without regard to the context within which it
functioned. Davenant advocated using the forces of natural law to bring
a more favourable order57 on what he knew to be either an unfavourable
order (high unemployment/low output) or legally induced ‘disorder’
(laws governing commerce distorting the market mechanism towards
an inefficient outcome).
Though Davenant’s work in its published form illustrates an astute
mind, the place where his monetary ideas find their most coherent and
powerful representation is in his unpublished manuscripts, ‘A memorial
concerning the coyn of England’ (1695) and ‘A memoriall concerning
creditt’ (1696). Davenant’s work relies heavily on the use of biological
analogy, a key aspect in the terminology of later authors in the descrip-
tion of the economy and the monetary system. His views on money and
trade in the ‘Coyn’ manuscript show how Davenant understood the
nature of a money economy and that money is not the wealth of the
economy but only a part of the general system, yet an integral and
necessary part of that system. In his comments on the problems with the
specie money of England during the Nine Years’ War he made an
important connection between the actions of trade and the sustaining
of a stable economy and political establishment:
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57. Or to be more economically correct – Pareto Optimal equilibrium. There can exist
multiple equilibria; one can be low unemployment with high output and the alternative
equilibrium point can have high unemployment/low output. Both exist and both can be
stable; it is just that one does not want to exist in the high unemployment/low output
equilibrium.
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This Commerce of Money does not only arise from Trade but often from
Warr, When a Prince has an Army to pay in Forreign Parts, that does require
greater Summs then the Balance of Trade with that Countrey can answere,
Trade and Money are in their Nature so mixed one with the other that it
Seems Impossible to consider them apart with any Effect conducive to those
Ends proposed by the Government
Trade and Money are like Blood and Serum, which tho Different Juices,
yet runn through the veines mingled together
And this present Corruption of our Coyn is like a dangerous Ulcer in the
Body Politick which is never to be thoroughly Cured by applying Remedies
to the Part, but by mending the whole Mass of Blood which is corrupted.58
The basic idea of a price-specie-flow-mechanism is hinted at in the works
of Davenant but not fully outlined or described. Davenant, though
successful in splitting money from specie and in his descriptions of
money substitutes, does not go so far as to develop this theory. In
addition, he outlined the principal concerns and uses of money,
although he does fall into some of the commonly held errors of his
day. This may reflect some of his focus on practicality of application,
something he developed during his time as a Commissioner for Excise.59
Davenant stated his monetary assumptions as his introduction to his
response to Godolphin’s questions on recoinage:
That the Importers who cannot Satisfie their Ballance with Commodities
must do it with Money or with Bullion
That if the Merchant can get more by sending money or Bullion then
Goods he will make his Returnes by Money or Bullion.
That Gold and Silver tho. they are the measures of Trade are themselves
but a Commodity
That the Nation which is not Superior in Trade can never Sett the price
upon Bullion [....]
That whatever price any Countrey setts upon its own Coine it will be
Esteemed with other Nations but at its Intrinsick value
That in the Naturall Course of Trade each Commodity will find its price.60
Davenant illustrates the separation between the basic commodity con-
cerns of specie flows and the overall economic well-being of the state,
insofar as he does not see bullion movements as explicitly damaging:
Tis truethatgoldandsilver tho’ theyare theMeasuresofTrade,are themselves
but a Commoditye, and may be Trafficted and exported, either Coined or
uncoined like other Commodityes without anyDamage to ye publick.
But this holds onely in Countreys which have means of inviting Bullion to
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them, aswell as occasions to carry it abroad, and cannothold in thatCountrey
which carryes it out only to pay a dead loss, or a dead expence.61
Davenant stated that, despite all concerns, trade was still the most
important aspect of the English economy. He made the important
statement of the need for trade and that England existed as a ‘price-
taker’: a small open economy in late seventeenth-century Europe. As he
maintained: ‘we are a Tradeing Nation, all our Interests are closely linked
with the Interests of Trade. The product of our Landmust be guided and
ruled by our Forreign Commerce, Almost whatever our Soile produces
must be valued here at the Price which the Luxury or Necessities of other
Nations put upon it.’62
The question that Davenant attempted to address in his manuscript
on ‘Coyn’ was whether the effects of an edict-driven change in the value
of the coin would be felt by the economy of England. Davenant stated
that this change would have no effect. He saw the adjustment as natural
and near instantaneous, resulting in no disruption of the flow of trade.
The intrinsic value of the specie would remain the same, an ounce for an
ounce, whereas the change in the extrinsic value of the currency would
be dealt with by changes in the prices of commodities. ‘No man can buy
by one valuation of Mony, and sell by another.’63 He expanded:
And since all these things are so necessary to the Being or well being of Life,
they must be had at what ever Rate they Cost: Nor can Law Interpose in this
Matter with any effect, for in the Naturall Course of Trade, Each Commodity
will find it[’]s Price.64
Davenant had a well-developed view of the market for capital, both
physical and liquid, in addition to his hypotheses on the nature of specie
flows. The rental rate of capital, or the price of that capital, was
illustrated in a quite ‘Classical’ fashion. The idea of the tenant-landlord
relationship as described by Davenant has much in common with
Cantillon’s view of the circular flow of income.65 In addition to utilising
his own calculations to make his point throughout this section of ‘Coyn’,
Davenant clearly illustrated the rationale behind the hiring of capital
and the letting of capital, which was similar to the Marshallian descrip-
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tion of investment. The only modern aspect lacking in his description of
the functioning of the rental rate of capital was his exclusion of risk:
In Letting Land for Rent, as in other Bargains the mut[u]al[l] worth of each,
are compar’d together and Consider’d. The Tenant takes the Land because it
brings forth such Commodities, as in the Markett will yield him such a price,
wherewith to sustain himself and to Pay his Rent. The Landlord lets it
because it yields such Commodities, and he thinks with such Rent to
Maintain his usuall Port, and manner of Liveing.66
Davenant used this definition to illustrate that the rental price of capital
cannot be dictated by law, most especially if that rate is below the market
clearing equilibrium, as no individual will knowingly take a loss on their
capital or produce even if the state attempts to compel them to do so by
force. Should the state impose such controls it would be detrimental to
the overall economy as it would precipitate a breakdown in the eco-
nomic and legal contracts between tenants and landlords. This break-
down would spread from the real economy to the monetary economy,
notably credit markets.
Credit is extremely important in Davenant’s economics. He argues
‘That the greatest part of Trade, both fforreigne and Domestick, is
allwayes carryd on by Creditt’.67 This position on the creation of credit
was further developed by Davenant when he came to describe the state of
English commerce, as the transactions were performed via credit and
bills of exchange:
as the publick deals with the people by giving Tallyes or Bank Bills, for Goods
and Money, so the people deal among themselves by assigning or transfer-
ring to one another those or such like securityes, which have no existence
but in Credit, publick or private by which the bulk of Trade is carryed on;
The Species rarely Intervening; Just the same thing being practiced in
Holland, and in severall States of Italy.
These sort of securityes are already equall to the running Cash, and if the
supplyes to be given hereafter consist (as tis likely they will) in Credit upon
remote ffonds they will far surmount it and grow the governingWealth of ye
Kingdome. If soe, and that they continue to hold their present esteeme there
is no reason to believe, but by their help the domestick Trade of the Nation
may be carry’d on in whatsoever condition the Coyne remaine.68
In ‘A memoriall concerning creditt’, Davenant again provided a more
developed look at his theory of credit than what is afforded in his later
works. This piece has two very useful aspects for students of Davenant or
of any late seventeenth-century monetary theorist – first, it provides a
portrait of the functions of credit and money and, second, it includes an
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invaluable description of the functioning of the wartime English mon-
etary sector. The necessity of money (be it paper or specie) and credit in
the economy was clearly stated by Davenant, and was similar to the view
of money that Hume would later make in his Political discourses (1752).69
Hume felt that money oils the wheels of commerce and that without it
commerce would grind to a halt. Petty stated that it was the fat on the
body-politick.70 In his mention of the necessity of money and credit
Davenant continued with this line of thought:
If there should be a want of Species, and of Credit, there must happen a
generall decay in the fforraigne Trade and Manufactures of the Kingdom.
The spring and originall of all our Commerce abroad, arises from the
Materialls that our soil produces, and those Commodityes which from
thence are manufactured. If the stock of 30. Millions formerly running in
Credit be much diminished, and if the species of mony be likewise wanting
to carry on the Minuter business in ye Market, and for payment of labouring
men and Artificers, the Manufactures of the Nation must stand still, and if
We have not Goods to export, we must expect no Importation, but such as
shall be destructive to us. Numbers ofmen, Industry, Advantagious situation,
Good ports, skill in Maritime affaires, with a good Annuall Income from the
Earth, are true and lasting Riches to a Country; But to put a Value upon all
this, and to give life and motion to the whole, there must be a quick stock
running among the people, and alwayes where that stock increases, the
Nation growes strong and powerfull; and where it visibly decayes, that decay
is generally attended wth publick Ruin.71
Davenant had bridged the gap between the ‘Mercantilist’ and ‘Classical’
world in this statement.72 He later stated in his manuscript that the
Government should not default on its loans, as this would undermine
confidence in the credit of England.73 If the public were to lose faith in
the sustainability of the debt held by the State, then the entire system
would ‘sink all Sort of Credit, and with it[’]s ruine, hazard the very being
of the Government’.74 This was similar to the predictions of modern
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macroeconomists with respect to unsustainable debt in developing
countries (and developed countries as well). If there is a falter in
confidence capital flight takes place. This results in a credit crunch
that undermines the real economy as well as destroying the monetary
sector.75
Davenant’s final monetary innovation was his outline of how a money-
substitute system would work in England, under the auspices of the early
notes of credit and bills of exchange that initiated the development of
the paper money system. As Davenant’s concern at the time was the
maintenance of the paper money system that flourished in wartime
England, he outlined the functioning of that system. Seeing the specie
standard slowly being corrupted over the 1690s, Davenant observed that
economic activity continued due to the ability of financial instruments to
provide liquidity and capital in the circumstances of a compromised,
traditional specie system. Davenant’s view of this new monetary system,
which was to become the foundation of the Financial Revolution, is
summed up as follows:
To make those Credits pass Currently from hand to hand (and so become in
the nature of a new Stock in the Nation, where with the Peoplemay trans-act
their Bargaines) they must be Secured upon Solid and Substantiall Fonds, In
the Same Manner for Debts hereafter to be contracted, Such Talleys as are
proposed to go in Payment of the Army, the Fleet, Ordnance, Civil List or for
Stores, or for repayment of Money acctually to be lent should be placed
upon Such Fonds as will every Year Clear off the Interest, and a certaine
proportion of the Principall. If Such Fonds can be found out and Sett afoot
the Tallies Struck thereupon will be as so much new Stock in ye Kingdome
and because they carry Interest with them, may perhaps in time be more
esteemed then money it selfe, and if Tallies can obtaine their former
Esteeme and value, Paper Credit of all kinds will revive of Course.76
Providing one of the earliest and clearest statements on the nature of
paper money functioning in an economy, Davenant showed himself to
be a master theorist. The interesting part of this statement on the
monetary system is that Davenant described an empirical reality; paper
credit became an integral part of the monetary system as specie flowed
out of England and alternative methods were required to engage in
efficient trade. The Bank of England was still quite new and lacked the
ability to weather a significant crisis. It became more and more apparent
that the costs of the war with France were finally beginning to com-
promise England’s economic viability. As Dickson has shown, the struc-
tures that were to dictate eighteenth-century finance were already in
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place.77 Davenant perceived these new structures, and his views on credit
and the monetary sector were descriptions of the first creaking motions
of this new engine of economic growth.
The considerable treatment of Davenant’s monetary theory above is
by no means complete; what has been described are the basic concepts
that he had regarding money and credit in England in the 1690s.
Davenant was able to see how new developments in public finance and
private credit markets had changed the economy of England. New fiscal
and financial instruments were altering the character of the established
specie-driven system and therefore changing the internal dynamics.
Gold and silver coin were very important but only as a monetary base,
and money’s definition was expanding to include other media.
Davenant’s proposals enable the reader to understand this development
process and provide insights into why his proposal was rejected and
Locke’s accepted. The movement away from a pure specie system to a
modern financial architecture was difficult for policymakers to under-
stand. Davenant was one the of the few who did, though the influences of
political patronage and a lack of understanding of monetary economics
resulted in his ideas being considered only by Lord Godolphin, who,
despite his rank in the Commons, was not in favour with the king.
The aftermath – institutional difficulty and
economic collapse
The monetary effects of the demonetisation of clipped/lightweight coins
in 1696 were not limited to the problems of the transactions demand for
money. Demand for hard cash rose as a crisis of confidence gripped
depositors in the Bank of England.78 Already weakened by losses due to
the exchange rate depreciation of 1695 and the management of Conti-
nental remittances toWilliam’s army since 1694, the Bank had little hope
of sustaining itself in the presence of a considerable bank run. The
demonetisation had destroyed all the remaining confidence in English
coinage and depositors of the Bank of England demanded that their bills
be honoured in specie.79 The result was a classic credit crunch – as the
demand for specie payments outstripped supply the run became a self-
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fulfilling prophecy and the Bank of England was faced with collapse.
Rose states:
On 6 May, two days after the final demonetization of the clipped coin, a run
on the Bank by cash-hungry depositors jeopardized its liquidity. Nor was the
Treasury able to help the Bank in its hour of need, for the state’s cash
reserves remained locked up in the demonetized clipped coinage. Faced
with the prospect of imminent financial collapse, the Bank swallowed a
bitter pill. In early July it reneged upon its commitments to Continental
creditors. At a stroke, confidence in English credit evaporated, leaving the
army paymaster in Flanders penniless. Not until October was the Bank able
to resume remittances to the army, and then only thanks to a substantial
loan from a worried Dutch government.80
As the monetary sector continued to contract violently, the bimetallic
situation continued to worsen. The price of the guinea had risen too high
and was causing additional stress on the Mint and on the monetary and
real sectors of the economy. Newton, as Master of the Mint, was respon-
sible for the maintenance of the bimetallic standard; therefore he
proposed a series of price changes to keep the newly coined silver
from leaving England. Newton proposed a price ceiling on guineas fixed
at 22s. This legislative action was to become only one subject of the great
outcry in the government over the mishandling of the recoinage. As the
king left for war in the spring of 1696 the country was in the grip of a
liquidity crisis (one of the first ‘modern’ economic crises) and the
inadequacy of the measures implemented by the government to retain
the old standard was becoming rapidly apparent. As seen in Figures 1-4
the state of the national accounts, borrowings and coinage was
deteriorating. Borrowing supported the war effort by 1695, revenues
were falling short and the intrinsic metal content of the coinage had
fallen to new lows. This grave situation was to be remedied by the
Recoinage Act, but as William departed, it was more than apparent that
the worst was yet to come. The Mint was terribly unprepared for the Act
and Newton had only £700,000 of new milled coin on hand to reissue as
£4.7 million had been brought to the Exchequer at that stage for
transfer.81 The lack of preparation was the result of a prior policy of
staff reduction at the Royal Mint in London whenmass quantities of new
coinage were not required.82
Themonetary collapse that ensued not only damaged the credibility of
the Bank of England, but also resulted in the creation of new systems of
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payment.83 Bank of England notes had ceased to be a viable alternative to
specie as the Bank defaulted and its bills were being heavily discounted.
One statement by a correspondent of the Duke of Beaufort is telling on
how grave the situation in London had become by the 5 May 1696:
at this time all money is refused unless it be newmoney or very broad [that is,
heavy or full weight], of which there is but little stirring. I was forced to enter
my name in a book to pay for my dinner, for they choose rather to trust than
take even passable sixpences. The Exchequer has a double guard these two
days, and the common people begin to grow a little mutinous.84
The failure of silver as a medium of exchange left a gap that was filled by
the guinea. It became the principal transactions currency during the
recoinage, despite the fact that it was an extremely high denomination of
anywhere between 22s. and 30s. in 1696. The demand on guineas and
gold completely changed the market for silver bullion in England, with
the price of gold and the price of guineas rising rapidly. This resulted in a
gold inflow into England and a continued silver outflow. The eventual
effect of this preference for gold was that it would take over the position
of silver as the principal currency of England. Gold inflows to England
dominated the concerns of the dealers on the Continent and guineas
rapidly became the standard means of payment. By 1717, when Newton
was still Master of the Mint and Davenant and Locke were both long
dead, the quantity of silver coinage had all been reduced to small change.
Newton continued to alter the mint price of the guinea throughout his
administration due to its persistent overvaluation. The problem was not
fully rectified until his final reduction of the Mint price of the guinea to
21s. By this time the quantity of gold coined was far outstripping that of
silver, and in 1717, £15,186 of gold were coined and only £948 of silver.85
There still existed a slight overvaluation of the guinea and as stated above
only small denomination silver remained in circulation. This de facto
status of gold as the readily accepted means of exchange and store of
value created a mono-metallic standard, the famous British Gold Stand-
ard.
The Great Recoinage was an example of early modern economic
policy at work. The objective of the Great Recoinage was to correct the
problems of a debauched silver specie coin system. England’s clipping
and subsequent recoinage enabled it to continue with the war, and gain a
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respectable peace with France. The importance of the Great Recoinage is
that it advanced economic theory and strengthened themonetary system
and institutions of England by forcing the major thinkers in England to
find novel solutions to a potentially devastating monetary problem and.
despite the initially inadequate solution, the gold standard was created
and enabled a stable currency to exist until the French Revolutionary
Wars and Napoleonic era.
The recoinage had been ill thought out and the proposals of both
Locke and Lowndes were destined to result in an outflow of silver. The
proposal for devaluation submitted by Lowndes was rejected and the
silver-specie focused policy of Locke was adopted. This resulted in an
overvaluation of guineas and continuing arbitrage of silver bullion out of
the country. The monetary effects of the Bank of England default were
substantial: England’s economy calcified for most of 1696, resulting in
massive unemployment, poverty and civil unrest.86
To treat the recoinage as only the product of Lowndes’s and Locke’s
minds is insufficient. They led the debate, with Newton left to execute the
plans of the government. Newton’s errors in the valuation of guineas
gave England a de facto gold standard. The monetary ideas that were
created and expanded upon during the recoinage formed the foun-
dations of eighteenth-century monetary thought. Lord Godolphin, who
usually is thought to have considered only the opinions of Locke,
Lowndes and Newton, also gave some attention to the ideas of many
of those on the Commission, such as Charles Davenant. The Bank of
England, paper credit, bills of exchange, the role of silver and gold, the
need for specie and the ideas of free trade and the favourable balance of
trade were all put to the test in these writings. As Sterling was recreated
as a mono-metallic gold based currency and the Bank of England
regained the respect and power it lost in the 1696 default, monetary
theory advanced. Crises have the ability to strengthen surviving insti-
tutions and encourage innovative financial instruments. England’s
financial system was able to weather the wars of the early eighteenth
century due to the discipline and lessons of this difficult period. In the
area of economic theory, the writings of Davenant began a debate on the
future of paper credit and economics that would continue throughout
the eighteenth and nineteenth-century. Later publications like Daniel
Defoe’s periodical Mercator (1713-1714) and Charles King’s British mer-
chant (1721) discuss Davenant’s contributions on the theory andmeasure-
ment of trade and money. In the nineteenth century, Whewell, Jevons
and Wicksteed drew heavily on Davenant’s data and theories (though a
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thought must be given to Gregory King, whose data Davenant used for
his writings).87
The ideas and commentary of Davenant illustrate the rapid develop-
ment of monetary theory at the time of the Recoinage. The Recoinage
served the purpose of correcting the problem of clipping but inadver-
tently created the British Gold Standard. Davenant’s work on coin and
credit makes all the more apparent the depth of the ‘Financial Revol-
ution’ described by Dickson and casts light on the importance of the
Great Recoinage in the history of Britain, the development of Sterling
and the history of economic thought.
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